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Reputation and Intermediaries in Electronic
Commerce
Clayton P. Gillette*
I. INTRODUCTION: SUBSTITUTES FOR CONTRACT ENFORCEMENT
It is a privilege to participate in a symposium dedicated to
Chancellor William Hawkland, in large part because of the depth and
breadth of his understanding of the role of commercial law in creating
robust markets for trade. Obviously, the most important
manifestation of that understanding is reflected in his work on the
Uniform Commercial Code ("U.C.C."). I hope that I will not be
considered to have deviated too far from the focal point of his
contributions by making more explicit a point that I believe implicitly
underlies the development of the U.C.C. and the current critiques of
its evolution. The point is that commercial law is necessary to
overcome problems of distrust that would otherwise frustrate
exchange. Successful systems of commercial transactions are
typically assumed to require a background set of legal rules that
clearly assign entitlements to traders, and a legal system that enforces
those assignments.' The former reduces transactions costs that may
derail otherwise efficient exchanges. The latter reassures parties to
non-simultaneous exchanges that they will be able to obtain redress
in the event of postcontractual breakdowns. By supplying both law
and a means of enforcing it, the state encourages market activity
without more invasive governmental intervention such as setting
prices or allocating rights to the goods themselves. It is on this basis
that some find correlations between national economic growth and
the development of robust systems of contract law.2
While this story of exchange explains much of the commercial
market, it fails to account for transactions in which contractual parties
would predict that state-sponsored enforcement will be underutilized
in the event of contractual breakdowns. Even those actors who have
available both clear legal entitlements and state enforcement
mechanisms will forgo legal recourse when enforcement costs exceed
Copyright 2002, by LOUISIANA LAW REvIEW.
* Max E. Greenberg Professor of Contract Law, New York University School
of Law. I owe thanks to Alan Schwartz, Robert Scott, Peter Swire, and the
participants in the Symposium on Unifying Commercial Law.
1. See, e.g., Douglass C. North, Institutions, Institutional Change and
Economic Performance 54-60 (1990).
2. See, e.g., Mancur Olson, Power and Prosperity (2000); Paul G. Mahoney,
The Common Law and Economic Growth: HayekMight Be Right, 30 J. Legal Stud.
503 (2001).
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expected recovery.' This calculus is likely to occur in a variety of
circumstances. The amount at stake may be very small, so that even
moderate litigation costs deter enforcement; the aggrieved party may
have to litigate in a distant jurisdiction, so that the cost of recovery is
high; the forum's judicial system may be considered untrustworthy,
so that the probability of recovery is low; or resolution of the
underlying dispute may depend on conditions that are difficult to
verify, so that recovery costs are.high and expected recovery is low.
In each of these cases, law will be of little importance to the
parties. In response, potential traders may eschew otherwise
beneficial contracts; alter the prices at which they sell or buy to obtain
ex ante compensation for the risk of unredressable breach; seek
lower-cost sources of redress (arbitration or dispute resolution within
industry tribunals4); or seek lower-cost alternatives to redress. This
last device includes monitoring the quality of the goods under the
contract, either directly by the buyer or through intermediaries.5 Ex
ante monitoring, however, is unlikely to be cost-effective for low-
value transactions or for those involving distant buyers and sellers.
Even if it is possible to find a third-party monitor at a distant location,
the lower likelihood that a distant trading partner will be a repeat
player indicates that agency costs between the monitor and its
principal are likely to be high. Even private enforcement mechanisms
such as gossip are unlikely to be suitable for geographically distant
transactions if the parties are not members of the same enforcement
regime, such as a local trade association.
These issues constrain the development of long-distance trade,
especially retail trade, that was initially promised when Internet
commerce was initially introduced.6 Notwithstanding expectations
that the Internet would vaporize boundaries, the need for buyers and
sellers to trust each other where compliance with contractual terms
cannot readily be verified ex ante or enforced ex post diminishes the
likelihood of trade. Thus, even while electronic commerce reduces
search costs and transactions costs of putting together willing buyers
3. One should not infer that enforcement would never occur unless expected
recovery exceeds enforcement costs. A rational commercial actor may precommit
to enforcing all contracts, regardless of costs, in order to signal that it is unwilling
to accept chiseling, and thus deter trading partners from engaging in minor breach
in the belief that they will not face litigation. See, e.g., Robert E. Scott, Rethinking
the Regulation of Coercive Creditor Remedies, 89 Colum. L. Rev. 730, 749 (1989).
4. See, e.g., Lisa Bernstein, Private Commercial Law in the Cotton Industry:
Creating Cooperation Through Rules, Norms, and Institutions, 99 Mich. L. Rev.
1724 (2001).
5. See, e.g., Bartlett & Co., Grain v. Merchants Co., 323 F.2d 501 (5th Cir.
1963).
6. See Yannis Bakos, The Emerging Landscape for Retail E-Commerce, 15
J. Econ. Persp. 69 (Winter 2001).
1166 [Vol. 62
CLA YTON P. GILLETTE
and sellers, its full potential cannot be realized if parties fear that
trading partners will perform opportunistically because remedies for
breach or chiseling are unavailable.
One plausible solution is to reduce the risk that one is dealing
with a potential breacher by monitoring the reputation of one's
trading partner. On the assumption that reputation from prior
experience is a valid predictor of future performance, reputation can
be particularly useful in the very transactions-those that involve low
values and those that involve parties who are geographically
distant-in which legal rights to enforce the contract are less likely to
be asserted and in which monitoring performance is infeasible.7
These are also the transactions that are most susceptible to expansion
through electronic commerce because the number of buyers and
sellers is likely to expand dramatically as search costs and
transactions costs are reduced in the ways made available by the
Internet. Moreover, the ease of communications with geographically
disparate buyers and sellers makes it easier to register satisfaction or
dissatisfaction about one trader with a larger number of potential
traders, thus enhancing the likelihood of discovering both positive
and negative reputational information.
At the same time, the vast number of traders on the Internet raises
the probability that any potential trader searching for a partner will be
confronted with an amount and quality of information that frustrates
efforts to discern a meaningful reputation. If reputation is to serve as
a sorting mechanism that allows potential traders to assess each
other's credibility, the information on which reputation is based must
itself be trustworthy, and the ease with which Internet users can post
information about a trader may reduce reliability! "Cheap talk"
raises the specter that information that is provided will be of little
practical use unless potential users can distinguish credible
information.9 The costs of overcoming this problem of informational
7. Reputation will also be important in transactions that occur over a very
narrow geographical area. If much of a seller's business is done in a small area, and
if the seller faces competition within that area, a bad reputation will cause that seller
significant harm since reputation can spread easily among the seller's customers.
But litigation, arbitration, and monitoring are also more plausible in narrow area
transactions, as the costs of asserting legal rights will decline. Reputation may
increase in importance in long-distance transactions because there are few ex post
enforcement or ex ante monitoring alternatives.
8. There exist, for instance, multiple websites dedicated to making negative
comments about commercial traders. See, e.g., http://www.chasebanksucks.com/
and http://www.thecomplaintstation.com/. Users, however, cannot determine from
these websites the likelihood of a negative interaction with a particular trader. They
can only discover the existence of such an interaction.
9. Jason Scott Johnston, Communication and Courtship: Cheap Talk
Economics and the Law of Contract Formation, 85 Va. L. Rev. 385 (1999).
20021 1167
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overload may reduce the feasibility of small value transactions among
distant potential traders and thus reduce the promise of electronic
commerce.
The legal literature has long understood that reputation can assure
quality of contractual performance and substitute for legal
enforcement. 0 But the traditional literature implies that the situations
in which reputation will matter have significant limits. Most of the
literature focuses on situations in which parties have repeated
interactions with each other and thus invest in reputations to induce
cooperation from their immediate trading partners. The salient
features of relational contract do largely depend on vulnerability to
retaliatory threats in a subsequent interaction to restrain each party
from acting opportunistically in a current interaction." Thus,
reputation has been assumed to have its most significant effects where
parties are engaged in repeat play, rather than where one trader's
reputation with a second trader affects subsequent dealings with third
parties. Reputation is particularly effective in relational situations
because long-term contracts tend to be incompletely contingent; as a
consequence, the specific obligations of the parties, and hence the
existence of breach, are highly uncertain. Ex post enforcement costs
will therefore be high, and ex ante constraints such as reputation can
therefore compensate for the risk of underenforcement.
In theory, reputation can have similar effects in transactions
among strangers, if there is a sufficiently low-cost mechanism for
communicating reliable reputational information to the affected
parties. In this paper, however, I suggest that the potential utility of
reputational mechanisms in electronic commerce is likely to be
hampered by the limited capacity of users to confirm the data on
which a reputation is formed. My concern is consistent with, but
separate from, the concern that the voluntary nature of reputational
systems discourages participation. That critique suggests that
participation will be too low to create a representative set of
reputational data. As a result, the information that exists will be
unreliable. In this paper, I suggest that even where participation rates
10. On the role of reputation as a substitute for contract remedies, see Lewis
A. Kornhauser, Reliance, Reputation, and Breach of Contract, 26 J. L. & Econ. 691
(1983).
11. See Robert E. Scott, Conflict and Cooperation in Long-Term Contracts, 75
Calif. L. Rev. 2005, 2026-27 (1987); Clayton P. Gillette, Commercial Rationality
and the Duty to Adjust Long- Term Contracts, 69 Minn. L. Rev. 521,559-60 (1985);
Paul R. Milgrom, et. al., The Role of Institutions in the Revival of Trade: The Law
Merchant, Private Judges, and the Champagne Fairs, 2 Econ. & Pol. 1, 3 (Mar.
1990) ("It is well known... that in long-term, frequent bilateral exchange, the value
of the relationship itself may serve as an adequate bond to ensure honest behavior
and promote trust between the parties.").
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are high, the quality of information may be of limited utility to
potential users of the system.
II. REPUTATIONAL INTERMEDIARIES
Even in transactions among strangers, reputational information
theoretically can indicate the likelihood of satisfactory performance.
In order to achieve that result, however, traders must have both the
opportunity and the incentive to communicate information concerning
their transactions to potential subsequent traders, and the latter must
have reason to trust the information they receive. 2 In order for
reputation to be reliable, it must be capable of assimilating both
positive and negative information. While traders may self-report
about positive experiences others have had with them, negative
information will likely depend on one party's reporting the
defalcations of another in a manner that is discoverable by subsequent
traders. In sum, a trader's reputation can reduce distrust about
dealing with a stranger if (a) credible positive and negative
information about the trader is available; 3 (b) there exists a
mechanism for communicating that information to potential trading
partners; and (c) the market in which the trader deals is sufficiently
thick that potential trading partners have a choice about the parties
with whom they trade.
Initially, one might believe that markets for information will
ensure satisfaction of these conditions. Potential traders who are
ignorant about prospective trading partners face a traditional
"lemons" problem.' 4 Some traders will only want to deal with high-
quality actors, but will have difficulty ex ante distinguishing high-
from low-quality. At best, potential purchasers will be willing to
offer prices that reflect average quality, a price that may be
insufficient to justify the transaction for a high-quality seller. As a
consequence, high-quality traders will be driven out of the market,
and low-quality traders will come to dominate.
12. See, e.g., Daniel B. Klein, Trust for Hire: Voluntary Remedies for Quality
and Safety, in Daniel B. Klein, Reputation 97, 104-06 (1997) [hereinafter "Klein"].
13. It is not necessary that positive and negative information be reported. If a
trader is aware that there are means by which negative information can be reported,
the absence of negative information may actually reflect favorably on the subject
of the report. But if the report is positive, and there is no credible outlet for
conveying negative information, a potential trader will not know whether the
absence of negative reports reflects a paucity of unsatisfactory experiences with the
subject of the report, or the lack of opportunity to convey negative information to
others.
14. See George A. Akerlof, The Market for "Lemons ": Quality Uncertainty
and the Market Mechanism, 84 Q.J. Econ. 448 (1970).
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This result can be avoided if high-quality traders are able to signal
their status at a cost that makes the resulting trade worthwhile. There
exist multiple ways to accomplish this objective. Under some
circumstances, a trader may itself transmit credible signals. By
engaging in activities that would be costly for low-quality firms to
mimic, such as offering guarantees, high-quality firms may signal
their status and thereby reduce search costs to potential customers. 5
Alternatively, a firm with a reputation for high-quality with respect
to one good or service may expand into additional goods or services
in the expectation that its reputation will spill over. For instance,
brand names constitute reputational signals that allow users of one of
a firm's products to predict the performance level of another product
sold by the same firm.'6
In other instances, however, traders will not be able credibly to
signal their own quality. Signaling theory requires that effective
signals, of high quality be immune from imitation by low-quality
firms. This may be difficult to achieve. Low-quality firms may
attempt to solve short-term difficulties or establish a reputation by
mimicking high-quality signals, secure in the knowledge that they
may not have to bear the long-term costs of their efforts. Long
warranty periods, for instance, may signal product quality, but they
may also be a viable endgame strategy for firms that that are unlikely
to survive to fulfill the warranty if their strategy fails.' 7
Where signals of quality sent by the traders themselves would be
opaque, because the signal is subject to imitation by low-quality
traders, third parties may intervene to clarify the situation. In order
to satisfy the demand for reputational accuracy, credible evaluators of
the reputations of others should arise to certify or vouch for the
reputational quality of a trader. Firms within an industry may be able
to signal their quality through an industry-wide self-regulatory body.
For instance, high-quality firms may form an association and impose
requirements for membership that potential customers will perceive
as capable of being satisfied only by high-quality traders.'8 Firms can
then advertise their membership in the association as a surrogate for
demonstrating that they possess particular qualifications."
15. See A. Michael Spence, Market Signaling: Informational Transfer in Hiring
and Related Screening Processes, 88-91 (1974).
16. Id. at 122-23. See also Benjamin Klein & Keith B. Leffler, The Role of
Market Forces in Assuring Contractual Performance, 89 J. Pol. Econ. 615 (1981).
17. At the time of its bankruptcy, Daewoo offered a standard 3-year, 36,000
mile warranty with a 5-year, 60,000 mile power train warranty. See
http://www.post-gazette.com/businessnews/20010119wheels8.asp (last visited Aug.
28, 2002).
18. See John McMillan & Christopher Woodruff, Private Order Under
Dysfunctional Public Order, 98 Mich. L. Rev. 2421, 2441-42 (2000).
19. Klein, supra note 12, at 124-25.
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Alternatively, unrelated third parties might find a market opportunity
in investigating reputational information and communicating it to
potential users. These intermediaries may be able to capture the
benefit they confer on traders either by charging for the use of the
information (think of Dun and Bradstreet reports) or by charging the
firms under investigation (think here of bond rating agencies). A
company in a particular industry that desires to issue stock in an
initial public offering may prefer to use an underwriter and attorneys
that are known for taking public similarly situated firms that have
subsequently proven successful. Potential investors may view the
commitment by credible experts of their own reputations as a signal
of the quality of the firm and thus rely on the participation of these
experts to solve the informational asymmetry that causes lemons
problems. Or the intermediary may provide the service as a by-
product in order to increase the value of another of its products.
Think of the Good Housekeeping seal as a means of increasing the
value of its primary good, a magazine. In each of these cases, the fact
that users of the information or the firms being evaluated are willing
to pay to obtain reputational information or to have their reputations
publicized indicates their belief that reputational intermediaries add
value.
Alternatively, intermediaries may provide signals of quality even
without performing evaluations of the party whose reputation is at
stake. Although Standard & Poor's and Moody's serve as
independent assessors of debt quality, and thus may be seen as
performing a monitoring function, their primary function might rest
not in investigating issuers, but simply in attesting to the fact that the
issuer was willing to undergo the rating process (at least where
issuers request ratings). Potential creditors might not trust
information transmitted directly by debtors and rarely will have the
opportunity or expertise to evaluate even credible information. They
may, however, attribute high reputational quality to firms that are
willing to present the information to third parties (the rating agencies)
that presumably have the expertise to evaluate debt and that have the
capacity to transmit the information to a broader population, some
members of which will be able to evaluate quality. °
These features, however, reveal two limitations on the use of
intermediaries to solve the problem of reputation. First, signaling
will not always be feasible. The new trader who seeks to signal
quality may, by virtue of being relatively unknown, be less susceptible
20. Conversely, the reputations ofexperts may suffer when they fail to discover
or report activities that indicate low-quality. Consider the current situation of
Arthur Andersen, which lost longstanding clients such as Delta Air Lines after it
allegedly was involved in accounting defalcations at Enron.
2002] 1171
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to evaluation even by a "professional" arbiter until it has entered
multiple transactions. Unlike a producer, whose quality of goods can
be evaluated by experts even before it begins selling, or a purported
bond or stock issuer whose financial condition can be assessed and
certified, a retailer who desires to enter long-distance transactions faces
difficulty generating a reputation for trust that can be appraised until it
has actually performed such contracts successfully.
Second, signaling through intermediaries is itself costly. Thus, it
may have limited application in the very environment of low-value
transactions in which it could otherwise serve as a solution to the
problem of legal unenforceability. Consider, for example, the market
for sports cards, which exhibits characteristics of both small value and
geographic distance. Until recently, transactions in such cards were
relatively localized and occurred between friends, at "bricks and
mortar" stores that specialized in such goods, or at shows that attracted
local buyers and sellers. These transactions were face-to-face and
allowed inspection of merchandise prior to sale. One would expect
localized transactions to be the norm in this market, since the small
value of the transaction makes the efforts that attract distant traders,
such as advertising or transportation to a new market, not worth
incurring. With the advent of the Internet, however, sports card sales
among strangers have the potential to become commonplace.2
Obviously, however, so does the opportunity for post-contractual
dissatisfaction. A purchaser of a card advertised as being in "near-
mint" condition would be disappointed to discover on arrival of the
card that it was printed off-center or had a frayed comer. Nevertheless,
the purchaser might have little recourse if payment had already been
made. A buyer of a card that cost $10, or even $100, would not likely
institute legal action against a distant seller, as the costs of obtaining
recovery would be prohibitive, even if the probability of recovery were
high.
The desire to take advantage of potential markets for trading sports
cards has generated the development of intermediaries who grade the
quality and condition of a card offered for sale.22 These intermediaries,
however, are unlikely to be used to evaluate low-value cards, as the
appraisal cost may be a significant percentage of the value of the card.
One provider charges from $6.00 to $50.00 per card, depending on the
speed with which the grading is required and the number of cards
submitted.23
21. See, e.g., the Sports Card Depot website at http://www.carddepot.com.
22. Multiple third-party grading services have arisen. See, e.g.,
http://www.beckett.corn/help/ListQuestions. asp? Subj ectID=6#5 5;
http://www.sgccard.com/main.html; http://www.certifiedsports.com/ and
http://psagradedcards.con/index.html (last visited Aug. 28, 2002).
23. See http://www.sgccard.com/new/fees.html (last visited Aug. 28, 2002).
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Even where the costs of sending reputational signals are low, the
cost of receiving them may not be. Where markets are thick, those
who wish to contract will have substantial choice among known
traders, so that the intended recipient of reputational signals will have
little incentive to inquire about prospective partners who are currently
unknown. That is, traders looking for partners are likely to adopt
satisficing strategies rather than make a comprehensive search of all
possible partners. Where repeat play is unlikely, it will not be worth
one's while to invest much in discovering information about a
potential trading partner because the search costs will not be
amortized over a large number of subsequent transactions. The result
is that even where reputation may in theory be able to compensate for
the inability of potential traders to enforce contracts, the costs of
intermediation may be too great to take advantage of that option.
III. REPUTATIONAL INTERMEDIARIES IN ELECTRONIC COMMERCE
These issues have become more important as the theoretical
possibility of trade among distant sellers and buyers has increasingly
been transformed into reality. Again, this development is due to
technological developments that promise to permit potential buyers
to deal with a broader range of sellers. What has become known as
business-to-business, or B2B, and business-to-consumer, or B2C,
electronic commerce potentially offers significant savings in
procurement by allowing firms to create on-line networks of suppliers
and to engage in on-line direct sales to consumers. This process
permits prompt price and quality comparisons and drives prices
towards marginal cost. These arrangements promise greater
efficiency because purchasers can better manage inventories and
compare prices among suppliers.
The potential for these arrangements, however, is much more
robust. To understand the reasons for this, some digression into the
basis for expanding markets is required. Internet commerce
ostensibly permits buyers and sellers throughout the world seamlessly
to identify and transact with each other. On-line shopping with a
seller in Seattle is as plausible for a buyer in Bangkok as it is for a
buyer in Walla Walla. Notwithstanding this image of globally open
markets, the geographic range for any given merchant is constrained
by a number of factors. The cost of transportation between buyer and
seller may render an otherwise appropriate sale infeasible. Language
differences may raise negotiation costs. Cultural differences may
increase the probability of misunderstandings and thus reduce the
24. See, e.g., Internet Economics: A Thinker's Guide, The Economist 64-66
(Apr. 1, 2000); The Container Case, The Economist 76-77 (Oct. 21, 2000).
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desirability of transacting.25 While the advent of international
delivery networks can reduce transportation costs, language and
cultural differences have remained. New computer languages,
however, promise to reduce, if not eliminate, these obstacles to trade
by expanding the capacity of distant buyers and sellers effectively to
find each other and to contract in common terms through Internet
commerce. The advent of Extensible Markup Language, or XML, is
expected to permit the computers of buyers and sellers to exchange
"structured" information, that is, information that contains both
content and some indication of what role that content plays (for
example, whether the content refers to text, headings, database
tables).2 " The attraction of XML is twofold. First, it allows exchange
of much more information over the Internet. Whereas earlier
computer languages were written to describe how data on the page
was to look (e.g., in a column or boldfaced), XML is written to allow
the programmer to say what the information is (e.g., price, shipping
option, color). In this way, programs can recognize documents as
customer orders or invoices and tell the computer what to do with the
document.21 Second, XML accommodates Unicode, a character-
encoding standard that supports the display of different alphabets
required for display of texts in multiple languages, so that, for
instance, information written in Japanese can be read in French. The
result is the easy exchange of information across jurisdictional and
cultural boundaries. 8
While these technological developments certainly help to
overcome previous barriers to trade among distant parties, that very
possibility increases other obstacles. The possibility of expanding
markets, especially where low-value transactions are concerned,
increases the ability of each party to act opportunistically in the
transaction. The enforcement costs of these long-distance
transactions are high and the expanded range of markets to buyers and
sellers diminishes the necessity for repeat play with the same trader.
Thus, it should not be surprising that claims of Internet fraud
predominantly involve Internet auction sales and low-value
transactions. According to the Internet Fraud Complaint Center, a
partnership between the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the
National White Collar Crime Center, 64.1% of all claims of Internet
25. See Clayton P. Gillette, Interpretation and Standardization in Electronic
Contracts, 53 SMU L. Rev. 1431 (2000).
26. See Norman Walsh, What is XML? (Oct. 3, 1998) available at
http://www.xml.com/pub/98/10/guidel.html (last visited Aug. 28, 2002).
27. See, e.g., Jon Bosak & Tim Bray, XML and the Second-Generation WEB,
Scientific American 89-90 (May 1999).
28. Id. at 91.
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fraud in a six-month period involved online auctions, and 83 percent
of the cases involved amounts less than $1000.29
Even where transactions are completed smoothly, the increased
competition permitted by expanded markets hinders the development
of long-term relationships in which reputation between specific
parties can be generated and trust developed. A buyer who can easily
compare prices and quality with multiple sellers may be less reluctant
to make purchases from a stranger than a buyer who must incur
significant costs in identifying and communicating with replacement
sellers.
While the diminution of long-term relationships may be seen as
a cost of electronic commerce, there are offsetting benefits (and for
those to whom the costs are excessive, of course, there is no
requirement to avoid ongoing relationships). Most obviously,
increased numbers of buyers and sellers should generate additional
competition and thus reduce the costs of procurement. The very
characteristics of easy exit and high enforcement costs in expanded
markets, however, make transactions more vulnerable to strategic
behavior by traders. Perhaps that is one reason why B2B auctions
have proven less popular than predicted, as firms continue to do
business through long-term contracts that promise steady sources of
supply with partners who have developed longstanding
relationships.3 ° While spot market purchases may allow traders to
take advantage of market price shifts, potential traders may be wary
of utilizing available technology in the absence of mechanisms that
engender trust with distant partners. The costs of traditional
substitutes for enforcement, e.g., documentary transactions, may be
too high if prices of goods are already competitively driven to equal
marginal cost. The development of trust, therefore, may depend on
the availability of a low-cost substitute for enforcement. Again,
reputation comes to mind. The issue that remains is whether
reputation can be communicated either by traders or intermediaries in
a manner that makes technologically feasible contracts commercially
feasible as well.
One plausible mechanism for communicating reputation at low
cost would be to use the same technological intermediary that permits
communication between distant buyers and sellers also to provide a
forum for information about the trading partners. In short, the
Internet service that facilitates transactions between prospective
29. See National White Collar Crime Center & Federal Bureau ofInvestigation,
Internet Fraud Complaint Center, Six-Month Data Trends Report: May-November
2000, available at http://wwwl.ifccfbi.gov/strategy/6monthreport.PDF (last visited
Aug. 28, 2002).
30. See The Container Case, The Economist 76 (Oct. 21, 2000).
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buyers and sellers could also allow postings of parties' prior
experiences with trading partners who sought to take advantage of
that service. In this manner, buyers and sellers who were seeking to
transact with each other through that entity could simultaneously use
the forum to determine the reputation of a potential trading partner.
Given the diffuse nature of the buyers and sellers in these markets,
having the same party offer both services could significantly reduce
the costs that would otherwise serve as obstacles to trade. Of course,
true cost reduction occurs only if the information that the
intermediary seeks to provide is credible.
Notwithstanding the novel setting, these are not new problems in
commercial transactions. When commerce first went international,
potential traders faced similar issues. Commercial parties who sought
to enter new markets were unknown by potential partners,
enforcement costs were high, exit was easy, and repeat play was
unlikely. Historians of commerce indicate that medieval trade
nevertheless developed broadly. Champagne fairs featured parties
from distant jurisdictions against whom redress through legal
intervention was difficult. Bruce Benson describes the conditions
that had to be overcome in order to allow cross-boundary trade to
flourish:
One consequence of (and simultaneously, one impetus for)
the increased productivity in agriculture and the urbanization
which followed was the emergence of a class of professional
merchants. There were significant barriers to overcome
before substantial interregional and international trade could
develop, however. Merchants spoke different languages and
had different cultural backgrounds. Beyond that, geographic
distances frequently prevented direct communication, let
alone the building of strong interpersonal bonds that would
facilitate trust. Numerous middlemen were often required to
bring about an exchange, including buyer, seller and shipping
agents. All of this, in the face of localized, often contradictory
laws and business practices, produced hostility towards
foreign commercial customs and led to mercantile
confrontations."
These barriers could be overcome by the development of a
mechanism for policing reputation and making information available
to prospective traders. The common solution was for the buyer and
seller involved in a trade to employ the intermediaries who matched
them also to serve as the forum for information about the
31. Bruce Benson, The Spontaneous Evolution of Commercial Law, 55 So.
Econ. J. 644 (1989), reprinted in Klein, supra note 12, at 168-69.
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performance of their trading partners. The best-known example
involves creation of the private Law Merchant, replete with
specialized judges and informal procedures that facilitated
expeditious resolution of commercial disputes without the
intervention of the state. Because the state was not involved, some
other centralized mechanism was necessary to transmit reputational
signals to the relevant merchant community. Once reputational
signals were received, members of the community could respond by
ostracizing those found to have violated industry norms. The
effectiveness of those sanctions meant that aggrieved parties were
encouraged to make claims and the "judges" who heard the claims
had the ability to broadcast outcomes to the relevant merchant
community.32 This was accomplished through a participatory process
in which merchant court judges were members of the trade within
which the dispute arose.
Early international traders could also self-police through
professional organizations, membership in which was crucial to
participation in the trade. Avner Greif, for instance, reports that
eleventh-century Mediterranean traders overcame information
asymmetries about trading partners by using agents who were
members of a coalition that could police constituents and who
implicitly contracted not to deal with any constituent found to have
acted dishonestly while operating for another coalition member.33
Just as merchant fairs in centralized locations permitted exchange of
information as well as goods, these agents could serve as a
clearinghouse about the reputation of actors as well as for the
transactions that sellers and buyers would be willing to enter once the
veil of distrust dissipated.
IV. FEEDBACK MECHANISMS 1N ELECTRONIC COMMERCE
Several centuries later, similar informational gaps among
geographically distant traders have generated similar solutions.
Perhaps the best-known example is the feedback mechanism
employed by eBay, the on-line auction website. This mechanism
permits both bidders and sellers to post information about their recent
transactions, and thus purports to give potential subsequent traders a
basis for determining whether they wish to enter into a contract with
a particular party. Other websites use similar systems for registering
levels of customer satisfaction. For instance, eopinions.com allows
32. Klein, supra note 12, at 172.
33. Avner Greif, Reputation and Coalitions in Medieval Trade: Evidence on
the Maghribi Traders, 49 J. Econ. Hist. 857 (1989), reprinted in Klein, supra note
12, at 137.
34. See http://www.eopinions.com (last visited Aug. 28, 2002).
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users of a variety of goods and services to post reviews of their
experiences. Categories include autos, colleges and universities,
home and garden, restaurants, and electronics. Users can create a
"Web of Trust" in which they indicate whose reviews they find
useful. As a result, the website allows users to customize a cohort of
credible informational intermediaries. Amazon.com similarly allows
website users to write reviews and then allows other users to indicate
whether the review was helpful. As a result, a reviewer may develop
a reputation measured by the comments of other users. Listen.com
allows users to download music, but also to write reviews of and to
comment on individual artists and works. 3
5
eBay, however, provides what is probably the most elaborate and
interactive system. It works as follows. One who enters the eBay
website36 is given a'choice of categories in which to buy or sell an
item. Assume, for instance, that a potential buyer clicks on "Books"
and then on "First Editions" in the search for a rare book. A click on
a particular book that may be of interest generates information about
that book, and includes the "user ID" of the seller and a seller rating.
Seller ratings consist of "stars" of different colors assigned to repeat
sellers on eBay's website. These stars reflect the "Feedback Profile,"
or rating, that the seller has earned by accumulating points based on
comments from other eBay users about the seller's contractual
performance. One point is assigned for a positive comment, no points
are awarded for a neutral comment, and one point is deducted for a
negative comment. For instance, in a search I performed while
researching this article, the seller with the user ID "Flatsigned" was
selling a first edition of "To Kill A Mockingbird." Flatsigned had
earned a Feedback score of 371. With an additional click, one could
view the comments that generated this score. The comments
consisted of 374 positives, 2 neutrals, and 3 negatives.37 If a
complaint about another user is registered, its presence in the list of
comments is highlighted by the addition of the term "Complaint" in
red letters. Positive comments are accompanied by the highlighted
term, "Praise," in green letters.
Sellers, in turn, can comment on their buyers, who are similarly
rated through points and colored stars. An eBay user who acts as
both buyer and seller in different transactions will have a total rating
that reflects all comments. For instance, one of the commentators on
Flatsigned was I eaglelady. I eaglelady was obviously someone who
spent significant time dealing with other users of eBay. She had a
35. See http://www.listen.com (last visited Aug. 28, 2002).
36. See http://www.eBay.com (last visited Aug. 28, 2002).
37. There were actually 419 positives. eBay counts only those comments that
are identified as coming from "unique users."
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turquoise star rating (Feedback Profile of 100 to 499) consisting of
156 positives and no negatives. Comments revealed satisfaction with
her as both a buyer and a seller, indicating that she played both roles
in her participation on eBay.
An eBay user has an opportunity to respond to a comment made
by another user. Thus, if one party made a negative comment about
a second, the latter would be able to reply. For instance, a book
purchaser complained that the seller had charged for shipping and
handling. The seller responded, "ITEM SAYS SH charges =
SHIPPING AND HANDLING CHARGES SO WHAT IS THE
COMPLAINT! !"3
Given the anonymity of the Feedback Forum, prospective eBay
users may be skeptical of a comment made about a buyer or seller,
because they do not know whether the commentator is idiosyncratic.
If I find that a prior buyer has made a negative comment about a
seller from whom I am contemplating buying, I may want to
determine whether the prior buyer likely suffered what I would also
consider to be a transactional breakdown or was just a chronic
complainer or a spiteful participant. A system that precluded
distinctions between bona fide claims of misfeasance and spite or
idiosyncratic expectations would generate too much noise to be of
great value. eBay helps to clarify the signal by allowing users to
view all comments made by a particular commentator. For instance,
Crixus left a negative comment about a seller of a painting. But
Crixus, who obviously does lots of business through eBay, left a
total of 539 comments, almost all of which were positive. There is
little reason to think that this user's occasional negative reaction
was a result of some idiosyncratic quibbling.
Many of these features suggest that eBay's feedback system,
which the firm assiduously updates and improves, has overcome
significant costs in generating reputational information that
facilitates trade. It serves as a forum in which others can exchange
reputational information at low cost. It is, in short, the twenty-first
century equivalent to agents who served as reputational
intermediaries at Champagne fairs. High ratings may serve as the
functional equivalent of brand names, allowing potential traders to
sort reliable from unreliable trading partners.39 Nevertheless, I want
38. Complaint posted by purchaser abchehe (91) on Aug. 2, 1999 and response
by seller bookerl7, available at http://cgi2.eBay.com/aw-
cgi/eBayISAPI.dll?ViewFeedback&userid=bookerl 7&page=34&items=25 (last
visited Oct. 3, 2002).
39. See Peter Kollock, The Production of Trust in Online Markets, available
at http://www.sscnet.ucla.edu/soc/faculty/kollock/papers/onlinetrust.htm (last
visited Aug. 28, 2002).
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to raise some questions about its efficacy and offer some
explanations for why it might not provide a complete alternative to
the threat of contract enforcement as a means of reducing distrust.
The information that eBay provides appears to be heavily
skewed in a manner that limits its utility. This possibility is evident
from the ratio of negative to positive comments. The ratio of
negative comments in Flatsigned's case, less than 1 percent, is by
no means unusual. Indeed, negative ratings are rare.40 Business
Week recently reported that more than 99 percent of registered
comments are positive.4 In perhaps the most thorough analysis to
date of eBay's Feedback Forum, Paul Resnick and Richard
Zeckhauser report that feedback provided by buyers is 99.1 %
positive, 0.6 % negative, and 0.3 % neutral. Feedback provided by
sellers was 98.1 % positive, 1.6 % negative, and 0.3 % neutral.
These numbers at least raise the possibility that comments suffer
from a selection bias that causes them to deviate from the actual
experience of users.
It is not clear, however, that the Feedback Forum fails accurately
to reflect the experiences of those who use eBay. One would
anticipate that most online transactions, like those that take place
face-to-face or through more traditional long-distance channels, are
concluded without complaint. Thus, we would expect there to be few
opportunities for anyone to create a legitimate negative comment.
Moreover, the very existence of the Feedback Forum may have
implications for the people who participate as buyers and sellers. One
would imagine that untrustworthy buyers and sellers would quickly
develop idiosyncratically negative reputations that would drive them
off the eBay site, as others would refuse to deal with them. Thus, one
might actually believe that, on balance, eBay participants are more
trustworthy than buyers and sellers generally, since they can more
readily be ostracized than sellers and buyers about whom reputational
information can less readily be transmitted. Business Week appears
to accept that proposition, as they report that the fraud rate on eBay
40. There are exceptions. One book seller earned a rating of 16, consisting of
21 positive comments, 1 neutral, and 5 negatives. See http://cgi2.eBay.com/aw-
cgi/eBayISAPI.dll?ViewFeedback&userid=tjbooksO813 (last visited Aug. 28,
2002).
41. See The People's Company, Business Week (Dec. 3, 2001) available at
http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/01_49/b3760601 .htnl [hereinafter
"The People's Company"].
42. Paul Resnick & Richard Zeckhauser, Trust Among Strangers in Internet
Transactions: EmpiricalAnalysis of eBay's Reputation System, at 11 (Feb. 5,2001)
(working paper for NEBR workshop) [hereinafter "Resnick & Zeckhauser"],
available at http://www.si.umich.edu/-presnick/papers/ebayNBER/index.html (last
visited Aug. 28, 2002).
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is one-ninth that of credit cards,43 though it is by no means clear why
fraud should be the standard of dissatisfaction or why credit card
fraud in general is the proper baseline for comparison.
Resnick and Zeckhauser provide some, but relatively weak,
support for the proposition that eBay works, invisible hand-like, to
eliminate untrustworthy actors. They note that buyers and sellers
with relatively little experience suffer a higher rate of neutral and
negative comments. For instance, sellers who received 0 to 9 positive
comments received an average of 2.83% neutral or negative
comments. The percentage of negatives declines to 1.25% for sellers
with 10 to 49 positives, 0.95% for sellers with 50 to 199 positives,
and 0.79% for sellers with 200 to 999 positives. A similar decrease
exists with respect to buyers." Initially, this reduction of negatives
with experience seems consistent with an optimistic story about a
working market that drives out bad competitors. But the story
becomes more complicated because the most experienced actors (both
buyers and sellers), those with more than 1000 positives, suffer a
sudden jump in the percentage of neutral and negative comments. In
the case of both sellers and buyers the most experienced actors have
a higher percentage of negatives than any group with more than 50
positives.4" This hook-shaped curve suggests that some actors who
perform in a manner that generates a relatively significant number of
negative ratings continue to survive in the marketplace.
The result of these findings is a somewhat noisier reputational
signal than the rosy story of a self-correcting market suggests. Some
of the reasons for this conclusion are simply intuitive. Reputation is
relevant only for repeat players. An eBay user who wished to exploit
the system might sell or buy on an isolated occasion and thus avoid
creating a significant reputation, whether positive or negative.46 The
non-repeat player is not driven out of the marketplace by reputational
sanction; he or she simply has no interest in continuing to participate
and thus is at the endgame point when reputation is irrelevant. While
the absence of a substantial reputation may decrease the market for an
occasional seller's goods, or make a seller reluctant to deal with an
occasional buyer, remaining participants may be sufficient to make it
worthwhile for the occasional trader to participate. For instance, an
untrustworthy but occasional buyer may win auctions through bids so
43. The People's Company, supra note 41.
44. Resnick & Zeckhauser, supra note 42, at 13.
45. Id.
46. In theory, sellers could also overcome negative reputations by trading under
multiple pseudonyms. eBay has addressed this issue by requiring new sellers to
provide identification (in the form of a credit card) which increases the costs of
changing identities without detection. If a user changes his or her UserID, eBay
reveals the prior names that the party has used.
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high as to overcome the seller's distrust, and be indifferent about
reputational effects from nonpayment or late payment if he or she
does not intend to participate in subsequent auctions.
Moreover, the informational content of the participants'
comments seems low, potentially too low to assure that actors who
fail to meet contractual expectations are ostracized. Comments may
be roughly classified as positive or negative, but the specific remarks
left by participants rarely provide more precise distinctions. Indeed,
they often appear to be highly routinized in ways that suggest that the
poster of the comment is making few distinctions among trading
partners. For instance, of the 546 Feedback Comments left by Crixus
as of January 24, 2002, the vast majority said the same thing: "A
pleasure to deal with. Thanks again." This type of comment creates
a binary evaluation (good/bad, positive/negative, pass/fail) rather than
a highly tailored system that allows distinctions among actors. It also
suggests that Crixus, likely a commercial repeat player on eBay, is not
primarily interested in conveying useful information to subsequent
traders with his or her trading partners.
If Crixus is not trying to convey useful information, the
motivation for his postings may be more self-interested. One
hypothesis is that Crixus is employing "cheap talk" favorable to those
with whom he has dealt in order to induce his trading partners to
return the compliment, thereby increasing his own Feedback Forum
rating. This observation about user strategies raises additional
questions about the potential selection bias on the Feedback Forum.
Other self-interested strategies similarly support the proposition that
the high percentage of positive comments reflects such a bias.
Consider, first, a crucial distinction between the use of a forum such
as eBay and its medieval precursors. In both cases, registering a
complaint creates a public good insofar as other potential traders will
benefit from the report of exemplary conduct or egregious
misconduct. As with any public good, production of reputational
information is unlikely to occur at a socially optimal level.
Production is costly to the producer and benefits others. Yet the
public nature of the production means that the producer cannot
capture the value of the benefits from the other beneficiaries. Hence,
the producer will be likely.to underproduce (where, as in the case of
information, personal costs exceed social benefits) or overproduce
(where personal benefits of production exceed social costs). In the
case of a closely-knit group of identifiable traders, however, these
tendencies may be countered by expectations of reciprocity within the
group (I should report misconduct because I will benefit from reports
of others), familiarity with other group members (I would not want
others whom I know to suffer the same fate that I have suffered), and
the capacity of the group to motivate the disclosure of private
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information about others' reputations by creating sanctions for silence
(I will disclose information even though only others benefit because
if those others subsequently discover that I did not disclose, they will
be more reluctant to deal with me). These characteristics all depend
on repeat play and common membership, features indicative of
medieval traders, but not of traders in a relatively broad-based,
anonymous marketplace such as eBay.
Indeed, the public goods characteristics of reputational
information in a broad-based, anonymous marketplace raise the
question of why we would ever expect posting of credible
information. The personal costs associated with creating a comment,
either positive or negative, seem to outweigh their personal benefits
insofar as those who write comments are simply conveying
information, gratis, to strangers. Public goods are frequently
produced as byproducts of private goods, such as when a defense
contractor manufactures a military aircraft for profit and thereby
contributes to the national defense. But analogues are difficult to find
in the context of posting reviews of a buyer or seller. eBay does not
provide any payment for the reviewer, although at least one other
website provides small payments based on the number of times a
user's review is read. These payments, however, are unlikely to reach
a sufficiently significant amount to constitute a major motivation for
writing reviews.
In light of the diffuse and impersonal nature of Internet sales, the
personal benefit that one might obtain from reciprocity or
membership in a group with an ethos for reporting seems unlikely to
apply to the writing of reviews. Thus, one must ask, why do eBay
participants leave comments, and what, if anything, do those
motivations tell us about the quality of comments that they post?
Given that posting comments imposes costs on the poster and
confer benefits on subsequent, anonymous users of the system, one
might initially think that comments will be left only by users with
idiosyncratic experiences or preferences. For instance, one initially
plausible explanation is that posting only occurs in bipolar situations,
i.e., when the participant has had an extremely positive or negative
47. Eopinions.com pays from one to three cents per qualified page view.
"Eroyalties," however, are only redeemable once they reach $10.00.
Eopinions.com also offers additional incentives for reviews. Additional payments
can be made based on the number of times a review is read and relied on by other
users. See http://www.epinions.com/help/index.html?show-eaming (last visited
Aug. 28, 2002). The home page provides information about a "Featured
Reviewer," complete with picture. It also permits creation of a "Web of Trust"
through which users indicate other users whose opinions they read and trust. See




experience. In these cases, the poster might find it worthwhile to
provide a reward (in the case of a positive experience) or a penalty (in
the case of a negative experience) that she believed was appropriate.
But if feedback reflects only cases of extraordinarily good or bad
service, then it is by no means clear that the information is reliable for
the average trader. Of course, a trader who consistently provided
service above or below expectations might be relied on for better or
worse service on average than competitors. So nonrepresentativeness
may not be as much of a problem as the "bipolar" explanation
suggests. The high percentage of positive comments, however, seems
somewhat inconsistent with this explanation. Recall that the
commercial markets comprising diffuse, impersonal actors with
opportunities to avoid repeat play have typically been seen as so
vulnerable to commercial misconduct as to require the development
of institutions of trust. That vulnerability is traditionally considered
the basis for the development of the Law Merchant and of earlier
forms of reputational intermediaries." It would be quite exceptional
if contemporary markets with those same characteristics were
immune from similar episodes of strategic behavior. At the very
least, one might want to explore whether some alternative explanation
accounted for the systematic tendency in the direction of positive
comments.
But there is a different reason for rejecting an explanation that
depends on "extraordinary" service. The intuition that feedback will
be an undersupplied public good appears inconsistent with the high
volume of feedback on eBay. Indeed, the amount of feedback that
users post seems nothing less than astonishing. Resnick and
Zeckhauser find that buyers comment on sellers for 52.1 % of the
items sold, and sellers comment on buyers 60.6% of the time.49 What
motivation accounts for such high participation levels in the
production of public goods?
Perhaps the calculus underlying the "public goods" explanation
is simply erroneous. That is, conceivably participation in the creation
of feedback constitutes a benefit to the poster rather than a cost.
Through participation, one obtains membership in a community,
consistent with consumption benefits explanations of voting."
Indeed, it appears that eBay works hard to construct a community
among its members.5 Full membership may entail participation in
48. See text accompanying supra notes 31-33.
49. Resnick & Zeckhauser, supra note 42, at 11.
50. See, e.g., Albert 0. Hirschman, Shifting Involvements 86 (1982); Clayton
P. Gillette, Plebiscites, Participation, and Collective Action in Local Government
Law, 86 Mich. L. Rev. 930, 951 (1988).
51. eBay, for instance, fosters a sense of 'community' by urging participants
to give to charities through eBay, promulgating 'community values,' and forums in
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the norm of generating information that is useful to other members,
just as medieval traders were encouraged to report reputational
defalcations.
Resnick and Zeckhauser similarly suspect a 'quasi-civic duty" to
comment on a trader with whom one has dealt.52 But this explanation
seems dubious, in part because it is difficult to reconcile a desire to
be a good citizen with the kind of brief, routinized comments that
characterize the Feedback Forum. Few would think that a civic duty
of voting is satisfied by casting a vote without forethought and
analysis of the issues, or that a civic duty of not littering is satisfied
by throwing trash inaccurately in the direction of a garbage can.
Brief, binary comments are arguably more like the latter examples
than the former. To the extent they are not, as I suggest below, they
do not necessarily translate into making reliable comments.
Resnick and Zeckhauser alternatively postulate a "high courtesy
equilibrium" in which individuals undertake small-cost efforts to be
courteous, even in non-repeat play situations. We are raised to avoid
saying bad things about each other, and this norm may have infiltrated
electronic commerce. This explanation is consistent with fairness
explanations for what initially appears to be inefficient behavior. For
instance, an actor may provide forms of compensation to others
whose activity appears to have conferred a benefit on the actor, even
though there was no explicit understanding that compensation would
be forthcoming.53 The donating actor simply perceives the
compensation as a part of the "fair" price to pay for the good or
service received. Perhaps of greater explanatory force, as illustrated
by the case of Crixus, repeat-play participants may wish to create a
norm of reciprocity that will enhance their own reputations. Repeat
players would like to have positive reputations to induce others to
deal with them, and may be willing to say good things about others
in order to elicit a similar response.54 Brief but favorable comments
on a trading partner induces that trading partner to provide a similar
comment in return, a process that enhances the rating of both actors.
which members can chat and give or receive advice. See
http://pages.ebay.com/community/index.html (last visited Aug. 28, 2002).
52. Resnick & Zeckhauser, supra note 42, at 5.
53. See, e.g., Elizabeth Hoffman & Matthew L. Spitzer, Entitlements, Rights
and Fairness: An Experimental Examination of Subjects' Concepts ofDistributive
Justice, 14 J. Legal Stud. 259 (1985).
54. In some cases, buyers and sellers seem to be repeat players with each other
and to provide reciprocal favorable comments. This process obviously does not
help newcomers who do not expect to be repeat players, since traders are likely to
treat repeat players more favorably than one-time traders. Indeed, to the extent that
this behavior simply exhibits tit-for-tat strategies for the parties, it may be
misleading to others.
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While each of these explanations provides some basis for high
participation rates in providing feedback, none of them supports the
more important requirement that feedback provide credible
information about buyers and sellers. Instead, these explanations
entail that feedback will be skewed in favor of a disproportionate
percentage of positive reviews. The very incentives that invite
reciprocity of compliments in order to enhance Feedback Forum
ratings simultaneously discourage negative comments that might
invite retaliatory comments that reduce one's own rating. The
potential possessor of negative information, therefore, is unlikely to
post the information. Retaliation explains at least some of the
negative posting on eBay. Consider, for instance, the case of
golfpoorly, a somewhat infamous user of eBay. Golfpoorly was
featured in the popular press for the sale, subsequently cancelled, of
an abstract painting that bore initials indicating that it might have
been painted by an important artist.55 Golfpoorly had previously sold
multiple items on eBay under at least two names. When I checked,
he had a rating of 11 consisting of 11 positives from unique users and
no negatives. Trading under the name of "advice," he had a rating
of 141 consisting of 142 positives and one negative." The one
negative was registered by an individual with the user ID
dbest902O@aol.com. That comment was registered on January 17,
2000 and stated, "BEWARE: This guy sells 'AS IS' FAILS to offer
disclaimer & REFUSES TO REFUND FFFF." "Advice" replied by
stating "LIE! Item was EXACTLY as described, and I OFFERED
refund minus costs-HE REFUSED. '58 "Advice," however, did not
stop there. On January 18, 2000, "advice" posted the following
comment on the Feedback Forum page relating to
dbest902 10@aol.com: "SELLERS BEWARE!! Buys on speculation,
DEMANDS refund if can't resell at profit." dbest90210@aol.com
responded: "FACT: We only buy. This TWIT lies, refuses to refund
& claims to be an ATTORNEY. 59
55. See, e.g., Saul Hansell & Judith H. Dobrzynski, ebay Cancels Art Sale and
Suspends Seller, N.Y. Times, May 11, 2000 at Al.
56. See http://cgi2.ebay.com/aw-cgi/eBayISAPI.dll?ViewFeedback&userid=
golfpoorly (last visited May 12, 2000).
57. See http://cgi2.ebay.com/aw-cgi/eBayISAPI.dll?ViewFeedbac&userid=
advice (last visited May 12, 2000).
58. See http://cgi2.ebay.com/aw-cgi/eBayISAPI.dll?ViewFeedback&userid=
advice&page=2&items=25 (last visited May 12, 2000).
59. See http://cgi2.ebay.com/aw-cgi/eBayISAPI.dll?ViewFeedback&userid=
dbest902O@aol.com&page-2&items=25 (last visited May 12, 200). Resnick &
Zeckhauser similarly find a high likelihood of retaliation. They conclude that there
is a strong correlation between negative feedback left by the buyer and seller in a
troubled transaction. Resnick & Zeckhauser, supra note 42, at 19.
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The effect of the retaliatory threat is not only to reduce the amount
of negative information posted, but also to increase the amount of
noise in the system. Third party users cannot easily adjudicate
between the anonymous disputants in online altercations. Posters
whose negative comments are met with accusatorial responses are as
likely to be considered wrongdoers as not. As a result, even those
with credible information have less incentive to post it, since the
information on' which they base their claims cannot readily be
observed or verified. Users of the system will not know where the
truth lies and thus will not be able to rely on either set of claims.
Short of claims of fraud, which eBay will investigate, there is no
equivalent to a merchant court to determine the bona fides of the
disputants, to punish those who make inappropriate accusations, or to
publicize the true identities of those who misbehave. The result is a
skew in favor of positive feedback, which arguably reduces the
reliability of the signal transmitted by the Feedback Forum.
A final concern about the high level of noise in eBay's signal
emanates from eBay's own instructions about making comments.
These instructions invite positive comments, but discourage negative
ones. The site contains a series of Frequently Asked Questions
relating to use of the feedback mechanism. The answers to questions
concerning the type of feedback that should be left subtly distinguish
between positive and negative feedback.' Positive experiences are
to be rewarded. Negative experiences, on the other hand, are to be
worked out initially with the other party. Only after that process fails
does eBay suggest the disappointed party "may" register a negative
comment.
Discouragement continues when a user actually decides to leave
comments. At least in earlier iterations, eBay actively warned users
of potential adverse consequences of posting negative information.
Assume that I wanted to register a comment about a seller after
concluding a transaction as the successful bidder for a book she was
selling.6' If I decided to leave feedback, I would use a form that
allows me to make a comment of up to 80 words. On that same form,
60. See http://pages.ebay.com/help/basics/f-feedback.html#2 (last visited May
5, 2000). The answer reads:
If you were treated well by a buyer or seller, reward him or her with a
positive comment. If you were treated poorly, try to resolve the problem
first by contacting the other person. Most problems can be corrected by
improving communication between buyer and seller. If things are still not
resolved, you may leave a negative comment.
61. Under the current system, sellers and buyers can only post comments about
each other with respect to a transaction they have completed with each other.
Previously, any user could leave comments about another user at any time.
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against a prominently colored background, appears the following
message from eBay:
You are responsible for your own words. Your comments
will be attributed with your name and the date. eBay cannot
take responsibility for the comments you post here and you
should be careful about making comments that could be
libelous or slanderous. To be safe, make only factual,
emotionless comments. Contact your attorney if you have any
doubts. You will not be able to retract or edit Feedback you
left. eBay does not remove Feedback unless there is an
exceptional circumstance. Think before you leave Feedback.
Please try to resolve any disputes with the other party before
publicly declaring a complaint.62
The warning is stated in broad strokes that seem to overstate the
circumstances in which liability would attach. There is, for instance,
no indication that truthful comments are not actionable nor that
statements of opinion are not defamatory. At least in an earlier
iteration of the Feedback Forum, the language concerning
''exceptional circumstance" was highlighted to provide a link to
eBay's Feedback Removal Policy.63 That statement informed the user
that, under the federal Communications Decency Act, eBay is
immune from liability for remarks made by users on its website, 0 but
that the users themselves can be held legally responsible for damages
to another party's reputation if a court were to find the comments
defamatory. That page, in turn, permits the user to review a mini-
treatise on the law of defamation by clicking on the appropriate link.65
The threat of actions for defamation may serve as a powerful
disincentive to the posting of negative information about other users
of the system. As noted above, those who post information will likely
obtain little value from the information they post. They may
altruistically or out of a limited sense of duty or fairness provide a
public good for subsequent users of the system. Alternatively, they
may, collusively or in hopes of reciprocity, offer positive comments
62. The relevant page is unique for each user about whom feedback is to be
entered. The generic website address is http://cgi2.eBay.com/aw-
cgi/eBayISAPI.dll?LeaveFeedbackShow&useridto=<USERNAME>.
63. See http://pages.eBay.com/help/community/fbremove.html (last visited
Aug. 28, 2002).
64. 47 U.S.C. § 230 (2000). While portions of the Communications Decency
Act were invalidated in Reno v. American CivilLiberties Union, 521 U.S. 844, 117
S.Ct. 2329 (1997), the portions regarding the liability of those who publish
information provided by others were not affected.




about other traders. Each of these explanations, however, would be
undermined by posting negative information. Some of these reasons
depend on the low costs of posting feedback. Others rely explicitly
on a tit-for-tat exchange in which each participant can improve its
own rating by inviting reciprocal feedback. Thus, these reasons for
posting disappear when posting entails threats of legal action or
vengeful retaliation that raises the costs for the poster. The detailed
eBay warnings about defamation indicate that negative comments are
not cheap. The result is that negative comments are likely to be
registered with a lower frequency than positive comments, relative to
the actual experiences of buyers and sellers.
There is some reason to doubt the existence of a serious selection
bias, notwithstanding the theoretical issues that I have raised. Given
the popularity of eBay, one might imagine that feedback ratings
would be ignored if they were unreliable. Yet there is some evidence
that users of eBay believe that Feedback Forum ratings accurately
predict the probability that contracts will be concluded successfully.
Resnick and Zeckhauser find that the effects of the Feedback Forum
rating on price was indeterminate. But they concluded that more
positives and fewer negatives and neutrals did affect the probability
of a sale.66 In a study of 451 auctions on eBay, Cynthia McDonald
and V. Carlos Slawson found a basis for a stronger conclusion. They
discovered a positive correlation between prices and the quantified
measure assigned to the seller's reputation on eBay.67 Sellers with
higher reputations for fungibly described items (collector quality
Harley-Davidson Barbie dolls) received more bids and higher prices
than sellers with lower reputations.68
One might conclude that participants in such auctions are
sufficiently well-informed about the market that they would not
distinguish among sellers unless the basis of their
distinctions-Feedback Forum ratings-accurately reflected seller
quality. There are, however, at least two reasons to question this
conclusion. First, successful bidders might have believed that
Feedback Forum ratings conveyed valuable information, even though
that was not the case, and even though unsuccessful visitors more
appropriately discounted the quality of the signal. As I have
suggested above, eBay invests significantly in persuading its users of
the reliability of Feedback Forum ratings. It would be surprising if
66. Resnick & Zeckhauser, supra note 42, at 16.
67. Cynthia G. McDonald & V. Carlos Slawson, Jr., Reputation in an Internet
Auction Market (Jan. 25, 2000) (working paper) available at
http://finance.lsu.edu/academics/finance/faculty/slawson/Slawson-publications.html
(accepted subject to minor revisions at Economic Inquiry) (last visited Aug. 28,
2002).
68. The mean winning bid was $263.55, with a range of $150 to $380.
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some people did not believe that the ratings included useful
information. And the logic of the Winner's Curse suggests that those
who are most likely to overvalue the information will win the auction,
as they will be most willing to bid an amount that reflects the higher
value they place on the information.69 Thus, the fact that auction
winners accept the reliability of high Feedback Forum ratings does
not mean that those ratings are widely accepted as accurate.
Second, even if all Feedback Forum users systematically believe
that the ratings convey useful information, that does not mean that the
ratings convey an ideal amount of information. McDonald and
Slawson indicate that there is a positive correlation between
reputation and price. They do not claim that the prices that eBay
auctions command is identical to the prices that would be obtained if
buyers had optimal information about seller reputations.7"
Finally, the combination of incentives and warnings created by
eBay suggests that it has potentially conflicting interests in the
accuracy of its feedback mechanism. eBay should desire that the
mechanism provide critical information about participants in its
auctions, as critical comments may convey credibility. At the same
time, eBay may be concerned that there not be too many negative
comments. An abundance of negative comments about any trader
might have spillover effects and imply that eBay traders generally
have suspicious reputations. Thus, eBay may wish to encourage a
sufficient percentage of negative comments to give the feedback
mechanism some legitimacy, without encouraging so many negative
comments to raise suspicions about the veracity of those who trade.7
Alternatively, eBay may have other incentives that do not reveal a
desire to skew comments, but that inevitably have that effect. For
instance, eBay may be concerned that it could lose its exemption from
liability as the provider of an interactive computer service if it is
too closely aligned with commentators, and thus want to publicize
its independence.
69. See Richard H. Thaler, The Winner's Curse: Paradoxes and Anomalies of
Economic Life (1994).
70. I am grateful to Alan Schwartz for this point.
71. eBay does monitor and remove from auction items that appear to be
frivolous or fraudulent. See Thomas E. Weber, Not Enough Elian? Get His Hair
on eBay!, Wall St. Journal, May 2, 2000 at B 1 (recounting offer and removal of
several items purporting to be related to Elian Gonzalez). On the possibility that
informational intermediaries will frequently have incentives to skew the information
that they provide, and that these incentives dilute their value as providers of
objective information, see Mark R. Patterson, On the Impossibility of Information
Intermediaries, available at http://papers.ssrn.conmabstract-276968 (last visited
Aug. 28, 2002).
72. See 47 U.S.C. § 230(d), (0 (1995).
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My claim, then, is that there is something more dubious
operating than Resnick and Zeckhauser's norm of courtesy.73 Both
participants and eBay have incentives to skew reporting of the
online auction experience in favor of the positive. The true
experiences of participants, therefore, are not reflected.
Two caveats must be added to this conclusion. First, it may be
that the absence of negatives means that those participants with high
positives really do not deserve their ratings. But those with a
substantial number of negatives possibly do. After all, if a
significant number of participants are willing to overcome the
obstacles to posting negative comments, the target of those
comments is likely a true bad actor. Resnick and Zeckhauser rely
on this phenomenon to suggest that participants may be willing to
engage in "stoning."74 Once one person has registered a negative
comment about a trader, others may be more willing to "cast stones"
as well. But this explanation relies on an assumption that
subsequent stoners act on reliable information. That is possible, of
course. But it is also possible that they are engaging in behavior
that allows them to perceive slight nonconformities in the
transactions as indications of the kind of bad faith that would lead
the poster to overcome the resistance to posting, but that does not
convey any additional information about the expected level of
performance by the target of the feedback. As Resnick and
Zeckhauser conclude, "it would be desirable if stoning were
reserved for behaviors that are deliberate rather than merely
careless."" -But if they are correct in observing a phenomenon of
stoning, then there is no reason to believe that those who cast
subsequent stones properly distinguish between the deliberate and
the careless. It may simply be that participants who observe that
their buyer or seller has previously received negative ratings are
more willing to attribute bad behavior to that trader if anything goes
amiss in their own transaction. Willingness to post a negative
reaction, on Resnick and Zeckhauser's explanation, may result from
herd behavior rather than from accurate perception of misbehavior.
In short, the mere presence of multiple negatives may overstate a
trader's low quality, just as the presence of multiple positives may
overstate a trader's high quality.
An additional caveat emerges from the work of Chrysanthos
Dellarocas. In a recent paper, he suggests that even a binary
reputation mechanism, such as eBay's, may induce efficient market
outcomes if parties act appropriately in response to imperfect
73. Resnick & Zeckhauser, supra note 42, at 18-19.
74. Resnick & Zeckhauser, supra note 42, at 22-23.
75. Id. at 22.
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information.7 6 Dellarocas creates a model in which sellers will be
induced to advertise truthfully if buyers are lenient when they rate
sellers (as I have suggested they will be), but buyers also strictly
interpret reported results about sellers. That is, perfect information,
and perfect reporting are not necessary to realize the efficiencies that
could be obtained if those conditions existed. But even Dellarocas
concludes that, while his results are plausible in theory, they depend
on a set of assumptions that are fragile in the real world.
V. LEGAL REFORM AND REPUTATIONAL INTERMEDIARIES
What the Internet currently provides, therefore, is a
technologically sophisticated system for generating trust among
strangers that can expand trade, reduce transactions costs, and
increase competition. To the extent that expansion of markets
simultaneously raises opportunities for misconduct and creates
concerns about performance quality, however, potential traders, wary
of lemons problems, are likely to underutilize this technology. eBay
and similar websites demonstrate the potential for curing the
informational asymmetries by serving as reputational intermediaries.
This, in itself, is no mean feat, and the efforts made by eBay to refine
its Feedback Forum reveal its attention to the potential for further
expanding the opportunities to solve reputational difficulties.
Additional advances promise greater utility for long-distance
transactions currently inhibited by fear of underenforcement. For
instance, while eBay appeals largely to both consumers and
merchants, other websites seek only to bring together distant
commercial actors. FreeMarkets.com, conducts business-to-business
online auctions for buyers of industrial parts, raw materials,
commodities and services. FreeMarkets.com contends that they
facilitate auctions by working with traders to select bidders to
participate in each auction on the theory that "when it comes to
industrial goods and services, not all suppliers are created equal."77
FreeMarkets.com currently employs no feedback mechanism such as
the one used by eBay. Arguably, use of such a mechanism would
increase the willingness of traders to participate in online auctions,
paying a premium or discount depending on the reputation of the
seller or bidder, as indicated by comments provided by other market
participants. Indeed, commercial actors might be even more willing
76. Chrysanthos Dellarocas, Analyzing the Economic Efficiency of eBay-Like
Online Reputation Reporting Mechanisms, (Oct. 2001) MIT-Sloan School of
Management Working Paper No. 4181-01, available at
http://papers.ssm.com/abstract--289968 (last visited Aug. 28, 2002).
77. See http://www.freemarkets.com/what-we-do.asp (last visited Aug. 28,
2002).
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than consumers to make appropriate comments, since those within the
same industry might develop the ethos of reciprocity and obligation
that facilitates comments.78
Can legal doctrine facilitate this process? If the threat of
defamation deters useful negative comment about online traders, then
it is possible that changes in defamation law would have a salutary
effect. After all, defamation privileges have long existed with respect
to comments concerning public officials and public figures in order to
generate more robust discussion that would increase public welfare.
Since New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,79 the Supreme Court has
subordinated personal interests in reputation to competing social
interests. Where defamatory statements are made with respect to
public officials or public figures, a speaker is liable only for defamatory
statements made with knowledge of their falsity or with reckless
disregard of the truth." These alternatives are gathered under what has
become known as the "actual malice" standard. The justification for
this contraction of liability may be justified in many ways, perhaps
most tellingly in Justice Brennan's invocation of the need for "robust
political debate" as implicating "the central meaning of the First
Amendment." But that justification obviously has less to do with
subsequent extensions of the higher fault standard to cases of non-
political public figures.8' Instead, the contraction of liability for
defamation appears implicitly to recognize the public goods nature of
valuable information and the subsequent risk that it will be
underproduced if production is susceptible to penalties. The traditional
concerns about "chilling effects" essentially recognize that, given
inherent ambiguity in the scope of actionable defamation, individuals
will forebear from providing negative information where there is a risk
that its provision may generate liability and potential providers cannot
easily capture the benefits that the information confers on others.8 2
Hence, the broad privileges that have been applied in areas involving
public officials and public figures essentially recognize that net social
benefits may be obtained by subordinating an individual's interest in
reputation, even though that requires tolerating certain falsehoods about
the individual. Indeed, that calculus applies even though the very
78. See Milgrom, et al., supra note 11. These actors may be considered to be
less in need of formal feedback mechanisms since they already have trade
associations through which they can exchange information. As electronic
commerce expands the market for suppliers, however, localized trade associations
are unlikely to have the capacity to generate sufficient information about a
:;ignificant percentage of market participants.
79. 376 U.S. 254, 84 S.Ct. 710 (1964).
80. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 580A.
81. See, e.g., Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323,94 S.Ct. 2997 (1974).
82. See, e.g., J. Hoult Verkerke, Legal Regulation of Employment Reference
Practices, 65 U. Chi. L. Rev. 115 (1998).
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existence of the privilege may increase the amount of false information
that enters the market (political or otherwise), because increased
immunity will induce speakers to be less wary of spreading falsehoods.
The question that remains is whether this same calculus can be
made in the context of business reputation so that defamation of
traders should also be subject to the "actual malice" standard. To
date, the "actual malice" standard has not been extended to the
commercial context. Indeed, the reputation of traders has been
protected more jealously than the reputation of consumers.8 3 But at
least in those areas such as electronic commerce where reputational
information can compensate for the difficulty of contract enforcement
and create more efficient markets, the risk of falsehood may be
outweighed just as much as in political contexts.
Indeed, it may b'e more appropriate to override protection for
personal reputation in the commercial context than in the areas where
broad privileges have already been accepted. The concern that
overrides personal reputation in areas such as comment on public
officials involves robust political debate; in the case of public figures,
the concern appears to be the public's right to know and the ability of
such figures otherwise to correct misimpressions s4 These offsetting
concerns require balancing one social objective against another. The
diversity of interests in these situations (e.g., reputational accuracy v.
political debate), however, may render the objectives
incommensurable, or at least subject to different weightings that make
comparisons contestable.
In the case of business reputation, however, the objectives being
compared are more similar. Current defamation law can be justified
as a mechanism that allows a firm to engage in market competition
without fear that it will be penalized by negative misinformation that
does not reflect the true nature of the business. In the absence of a
broad defamation standard, one business might seek competitive
advantage by falsely disparaging another. Business defamation law,
therefore, serves the social function of ensuring robust economic
83. Many courts distinguish traders or merchants from "nontraders," or persons
who are not traders or merchants and who are not engaged in vocations that require
credit to conduct their business. See 99 A.L.R. 2d 700 (1965). In many
jurisdictions, listing a nontrader as a debtor in a publication circulated among
merchants is not per se libelous, though it would be if the target of the comment
were a merchant. See, e.g., Ragland v. Household Finance Corp., 119 N.W.2d 788
(1963) (if person alleging liable was not engaged in profession or employment
where credit is essential a statement citing unpaid debt does not on its face render
complainant unworthy of public trust); Reese v. Haywood, 360 S.W.2d 488 (1962)
(no showing of actual damages at trial proving publication had damaged credit);
Harrison v. Burger, 103 So. 842 (1925).
84. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 94 S.Ct. 2997 (1974).
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markets through competition based on price and quality rather than
on denigration of a trader's conduct. The objective of business
defamation law, on this understanding, is to create incentives for the
creation of accurate reputation, not simply to protect the business
from negative comment.
This interest might be properly served by broad defamation
liability, notwithstanding that it deters truthful derogatory comment,
where traders operate within relatively narrow geographical ranges
and trading is largely face-to-face. In this environment, the risk of
false charges of misconduct could be severe, as they would be
circulated within the trader's limited market. At the same time, it
would be less necessary to tolerate falsehoods in order to generate
reputational information, since trade within a confined area is more
susceptible to traditional legal enforcement for which reputation is a
substitute. The current (and forthcoming) commercial environment
of electronic commerce, however, varies in two ways that may require
a different balance. First, as I have argued, it depends more on
reputational information as a substitute for costly enforcement.
Second, it requires more incentives for the provision of information
if a trader's reputation is to reflect accurately its dealings in the
market. Each of these factors points to a need for greater toleration
for negligent falsehoods. But that toleration is required to achieve in
this context the same objective that heretofore was advanced by
constraints on defamatory comment, i.e., the generation of
reputational information that accurately reflects a trader's status.
None of this is to say that there are no serious competing
considerations in favor of the current law of business defamation. Put
aside the powerful interest in favor of personal reputation and
consider only whether constraints on defamation will in fact serve
reputational accuracy. Constraining liability does not necessarily
encourage more truthful disclosure. At best it reduces disincentives
to avoid negative disclosure and thus induces more comment. If the
additional information is likely to be truthful, then that reduction may
be appropriate. If, on the other hand, there is reason to believe that
additional disclosure would tend to be false, because traders are less
likely to be careful with their statements or can speak with greater
immunity out of a desire for vengeance rather than for veracity, then
the objective of reputational accuracy would not be served. Instead,
we would simply be left with more noise in the system, as the mix of
truthful and untruthful negative statements produces ambiguity. In
that case, information would be less credible and less useful to
potential subsequent traders. One might expect that ambiguity on the
negative side would only counterbalance ambiguity on the positive
side that currently exists as a result of skews against negative
comments and the capacity of traders to "puff' their reputations
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through reciprocal postings with repeat players." That is an empirical
question to which I have no response, other than to wonder whether
we believe that 35 years of experience with constrained standards of
defamation in areas concerning public officials and public figures has
increased the percentage of falsehoods with respect to those parties.
At best we can speculate as to whether the incentives that traders
would have to make comments in the first instance would
systematically induce them to make truthful or false comments.
Nevertheless, I am highly dubious that reform of defamation laws
will have much effect in generating more accurate information in
electronic commerce. The disincentives to convey negative
information that emerge from potential defamation liability likely are
swamped by disincentives from other sources that are less readily
addressable through law. Recall that reputational intermediaries are
necessary because the contracts at issue are not readily susceptible to
legal enforcement. The parties are too distant and the value of the
transaction too small to warrant incurring enforcement costs. But if
that is the case, then it is also unlikely that the parties will litigate
about defamation. Reputational harm done by 'defamation may
exceed the value of the individual contract, but given that we are
dealing with low-value contracts, it is plausible that even a trader who
could demonstrate that she had lost multiple subsequent contracts as
a result of a defamatory statement would still not prove sufficient
losses to warrant the costs of litigation at all, much less of litigation
in a distant jurisdiction.
Moreover, the threat of defamation liability likely does less to
retard negative comments than informal sanctions such as retaliation,
norms against making negative statements, and the discouragement
of intermediaries such as eBay. And the incentives for positive
comments, e.g., inducing reciprocity that enhances the reputations of
both traders, or adhering to the norm that eBay creates of making
positive comments as a form of reward, will likely introduce a
selection bias in favor of positive comments regardless of the level of
negative comments.
CONCLUSION
Commercial markets can achieve the efficiencies made possible
by new technologies only if participants can solve the problems of
distrust that are endemic among distant traders who have low exit
costs or who engage in the low-value transactions that technology
increasingly makes possible. Reputation can be a powerful means of
assuring contractual performance, and may be particularly useful in
85. See supra note 50.
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these environments where the threat of state-supported enforcement
is weak. Technology can assist here as well, by offering a forum for
reputational intermediaries. But technology cannot of itself provide
the information necessary for credible reputation. That information
can best be provided by the participants themselves. Yet those with
the relevant information may have the least reason to convey it to
others. If users are to play the role of reputational intermediaries,
they must be willing to convey credible negative information as well
as positive information. If there exists a systemic bias in favor of
positive comments, then signals of reputation are likely to be so noisy
or misleading as to undermine their credibility and utility as
substitutes for contract enforcement.
The extent to which legal reform can address this issue is itself
questionable. Legal reform can marginally reduce disincentives that
emerge from fear of liability, by creating immunities against that
liability. But if the potential reputational intermediaries and those
who possess information have other self-interested reasons for
skewing the information that they convey, legal rules may be less
effective in ensuring the accuracy of the reputational signal.
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